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ABSTRACT 
The Private Health Insurance Incentives Act (1998) (PHIIA) provides a universal subsidy to private health 
insurance. It was justified on two main grounds: that increased private insurance would ease the pressure on 
the publicly funded portions of the health system,  and that the PHIIA would mitigate the adverse selection 
consequences of community rating. This paper argues that since insurers are able to design plans to 
separate risk groups, the consequences of adverse selection may have been exaggerated. Using data on 
claims and insurance coverage, little evidence of adverse selection is found in the 1998 September quarter. 
This paper also argues that the reduction in demand for public health services as a result of the subsidy is 
likely to be small for a number of reasons. Using data from the September 2000 quarter on membership of 
hospital insurance, we find that the subsidy attracted mostly young individuals into private insurance. 
While these individuals make few demands on the public sector, the lack of targeting means that they 
attract the same premium  subsidy as older people. Therefore, the expected savings to the public hospital 
sector of the PHIIA may be considerably less than the  cost.   
  1 
1 Introduction   
The Private Health Insurance Incentives Act (1998) (PHIIA) provides a 30 per cent 
subsidy to the purchase of private health insurance from 1 January 1999.  Accompanying 
this scheme is a 1 per cent levy imposed on high income earners who do not purchase 
health insurance. Prior to the introduction of this legislation, there existed a more targeted 
incentive scheme existing from July 1997 which subsidised private health  insurance for 
people with income below a specified threshold.  
The cost to government of the earlier targeted scheme was $600 million
1 .  However, 
because the PHIIA is universal, the cost is predicted to be around $2.19 billion
2 . The 
PHIIA is clearly a more expensive scheme than the one it replaced, and was justified on 
two grounds: that increased private insurance would ease the pressure on the publicly 
funded portions of the health system and secondly, that it would mitigate the adverse 
selection consequences of community rating.
3  
The purpose of this present paper is to provide a critique of the PHIIA. We first argue 
that the effect of private insurance on utilisation of public expenditure might be over-
stated.  The argument that increasing insurance coverage causes individuals to switch 
from the private to the public sector is flawed for a number of reasons.  
Many Australians choose not to be insured, but avail themselves of private hospitals if 
the need arises. These “self-insured” people, who account for roughly 10 per cent of the 
population, will be the first to obtain private insurance when a subsidy is offered. 
However, expanding insurance coverage to these self-insured consumers does not reduce 
the demand for public sector services. Of course, if the insurance  subsidy is large 
enough,  insurance will also be taken up by consumers who intend to switch from the 
public system to the private. The problem is that the “first dollar” of subsidy may have no 
impact on the demand for public services.  
                                                            
1 Hall (1999) 
2 Duckett and Jackson (2000) 
3 For a discussion of the institutional arrangements in the health insurance industry, the reader is referred to Hall (1999) 
and Smith (2000) (table 1).   
  2 
Health care costs are extremely skewed towards the older age group. Data on hospital 
utilisation indicates that while the over-55 age group comprises only 23 per cent of the 
general population, they account for 65 per cent of the total bed days in all hospitals 
during the 1998-99 year. Therefore, if the bulk of people who are insured as a result of 
the subsidy are relatively young, the savings in the public sector will be small. We show 
that so far, increased insurance coverage due to the PHIIA has tended to be 
disproportionately amongst the younger population. While this may be the outcome 
sought by the Government, the expected savings on the public health system are likely to 
be low – and potentially less than the cost of the subsidy.  
We also argue that the adverse selection consequences of community rating might be 
over-stated. If insurers are able to design plans in such a way as to cause younger 
consumers to self-select into separate plans, then the adverse selection problems 
associated with community rating is reduced. We find that, in comparison to New 
Zealand where community rating is not imposed, Australia has a far greater variety of 
plans. This suggests that plan design is being used in Australia to overcome the problems 
associated with community rating regulation.  We also find that the plan uptake amongst 
various age-groups in 1998 was fairly similar – despite substantial differences in benefits. 
Therefore, we find little evidence of adverse selection in 1998, which contradicts one of 
the principle justifications for the introduction of PHIIA.   
2  Easing the burden on medicare 
The major argument in support of the PHIIA is that insured patients reduce the demand 
on the publicly funded system and therefore ought to subsidised. The Minister for Health, 
Micheal Wooldridge, had the following to say : 
 
“... the health of the publicly funded health sector depends upon a vital private sector. 
Having some six million Australians with private health insurance directly pays for 
around one-third of the costs of hospital care in Australia. If there were no private sector, 
the extra costs borne by the taxpayer would simply be incalculable and the increased 
demand on public hospitals would be unsustainable.” Wooldridge (1998).   
  3 
The general idea is that when patients face a choice between private and public services, 
insured patients will be more likely to use the private system. Therefore, it is argued that 
expanding insurance coverage means that consumers who would have previously used 
the publicly funded system will transfer to the private system. 
This proposition ignores the fact that many consumers prefer the public hospital system 
because there are no user-part charges and the quality of care is often perceived as being 
superior (although the hotel services may be less convenient). These patients tend to turn 
to the private sector only when and if the waiting list is particularly long.  
This argument fails to address two important issues: (1) many consumers are self-insured; 
and (2) many of the consumers who are induced to insure as a result of the PHIIA tend to 
be young and healthy and therefore make few demands on the public system anyway. 
In the current system, a number of consumers choose to be self-insured in the sense that 
they pay for private care if they fall ill – but are not insured. Consumers who are 
insufficiently risk averse, are wealthy or consider themselves to be a particularly good 
risk may choose to self-insure. Indeed, since the average benefit paid per episode in 
hospital for insured patients is around $2,000
4 , self-insurance is feasible. Department of 
Health and Aged Care (undated) cites data indicating that the exit from insurance since 
1992 was concentrated amongst wealthier families. These wealthy families may have 
been opting out of insurance and into self-insurance (rather than into the public sector).  
While it is difficult to obtain figures on the percentage of people who choose this option, 
the Productivity Commission reports that around 9 per cent of patients admitted to private 
hospitals paid for the service themselves
5. If self-insured individuals have a lower than 
average chance of hospitalisation, then this 9 per cent figure indicates self-insurance of 
more than 9 per cent in the population as a whole. The possibility that private providers 
offer price discounts to the uninsured adds to the attraction of being self-insured.  
                                                            
4 Calculated from the PHIAC A Report for September 2000.  
5 Private Hospitals in Australia : Productivity  Commission Research Paper. December 1999. Available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/otherres/privatehospitals/index.html  
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In Vaithianathan (2000) we show that if there exists a portion of consumers who are self-
insured, then premium subsidies may have no impact at all on the public health system. 
This is because under fairly general conditions
6, the first group of people to whom 
insurance coverage is expanded as a result of subsidies are the self-insured. However, 
because increasing insurance coverage of the self-insured has no impact on the public 
health system, there is little gain to the public sector from the PHIIA. Of course, if the 
subsidy is large enough, then eventually consumers who were previously using the public 
system will purchase health insurance and switch to the private system. However, if the 
purpose of the policy is to ease the burden on the public system, insurance subsidies are a 
particularly poor mechanism for  doing so.  
Directly subsidising private care, on the other-hand, is a more cost-effective mechanism 
for reducing the demand for the public health system. The “first dollar” of such a price 
subsidy scheme reduces demand for public health services – although the extent of this 
will depend on the responsiveness of demand for private care as well as the level of 
current consumption. Of course, it could be argued that a subsidised private sector is in 
reality a public sector with higher user-charges!  
2.1  How much can the public sector save through insurance expansion? 
 
Expansion of health insurance may have little impact in reducing costs in the public 
sector if it is only attracting young, healthy consumers into private insurance. This is 
because health expenditure is highly skewed, with most health expenditure being spent in 
the last decade of life. This means that most of the public sector expenditure is on the 




                                                            
6 Vaithianathan (2000) provides a more formal discussion of this case and provides sufficient conditions for insurance 
subsidies to make no difference to demand for public hospital services.   
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Figure 1 Separations from public hospitals (1998-99) 
Source: Hospital Statistics, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the hospital benefits per head of population claimed from insurers in 
the September 2000 quarter. The columns represent the average hospital claim per head 
of population in each age category, while the line represents the net increase in the 
insured population within each age band from December 1998 to September 2000. A 
feature of this graph is that the bulk of the consumers who entered the pool of insurance 
within this period were the young and healthy.  One explanation for this is that the older 
age group are unlikely to be motivated by the avoidance of the medicare levy, to purchase 
insurance.  
The younger age groups have very low levels of hospital expenditure, and therefore 
transferring these consumers to the private sector would not be expected to save the 
public sector a large amount of money. However, the lack of age targeting of the 
insurance subsidy means that a twenty four year old who buys private insurance receives 
the same subsidy as an eighty year old, even though the latter may be expected to save 















75 and over 
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Figure 2: Net increase in insurance and average hospital benefit claims by age (Dec qtr 
1998-Sept qtr 2000) 
Source: PHIAC Report (various years) for benefits and number insured  
 
To roughly estimate the potential quarterly savings to the public sector from the 
insurance subsidy, we undertook the following exercise. We obtained data on the value of 
total hospital benefits claimed from private health insurance funds by age group. We then 
calculated benefits per head in each age category. We made the generous assumption that 
all the net increase in membership between the quarter ended December 1998 -  when the 
new scheme was announced - and the September quarter of 2000 was attributable to the 
PHIIA. Using these average benefits per age category as weights, we calculated the 
weighted total of benefits that would be claimed by those who entered during the period. 
The increase in claims calculated in this manner was estimated to be around $200 million 
per quarter (or $800 million for the year).  If these new entrants are shifting their demand 
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private sector is equal to the value of benefits they would have claimed in the public 
sector, then the public sector is saving around $800 million per annum of hospital care by 
providing this subsidy.  However, the cost of the subsidy is expected to be more than $2  
billion (Duckett and Jackson (2000)).   
Of course this calculation ignores the substantial out-of-pocket expenditure by consumers 
on health services, which implies that consumers would have consumed services  in 
excess of $800 million. We also ignore the non-hospital ancillary benefits that are paid 
out by private insures such as ambulance costs,  dental work and physiotherapy.  
However, because a large proportion of these ancillary services are not provided by the 
publicly funded portion of the health system, the reimbursement  of these type of services 
by insurers cannot be readily construed as a shift from the public to the private sector. 
It is clear that the combination of the Medicare levy and the insurance subsidy has 
considerably expanded the insurance coverage amongst the younger people. While this 
may not help the public sector directly, it is argued that expanding insurance to this age 
group could improve the long term sustainability of private insurance. In particular, it 
could reduce the price of insurance to older age groups and thereby expand coverage 
amongst this target group.  However, as the older age group join, the total costs of plans 
will rise and insurance will become expensive once again.  
 
3  Community rating  
Community rating means that consumers cannot face differentiated premiums due to 
difference in age and other risk factors. The benefit of community rating is that it 
provides lifetime insurance (Jack (1998)). If community rating is removed, then an 
individual’s future premium may rise with age or health shocks, resulting in less than 
lifetime cover.  An additional attraction of community rating is that there is cross-subsidy 
of health expenditure, so that the price of health insurance is relatively low.  
The draw-back to community rating is that insurers are forced to sell insurance at the 
same price to all consumers regardless of risk.  In this case, only high risk consumers  
  8 
such as the elderly and those in poor health will purchase private insurance. Individuals 
who have a low risk of falling ill will opt-out of the private health insurance and “self-
insure” rather than subsidising high risk.  
Therefore, under community rating, we may predict a deterioration of the average risk of 
the insured pool and an increasing premium until eventually only the highest risk or the 
most cautious are insured. This naturally leads to the conclusion that in order to sustain 
the private insurance market in the presence of community rating, insurers will need to be 
subsidised so that low(er) risk types will be subsidised into the insurance pool. The 
following passage from the Department of Health and Aged Care (undated) articulates 
this argument: 
“Under Australia’s system of community rating, healthier members support sicker 
members (which are typically relatively more elderly). ...Means testing (of insurance 
subsidy) runs the risk of eroding this cross subsidy by encouraging younger, relatively 
better off, lower risk people to drop their private cover. This would leave the relatively 
older, poorer, higher risk people in private health insurance” (p17).  
In this section we argue that plan selection  can overcome adverse selection in the private 
insurance market. Therefore, the role of adverse selection in justifying the PHIIA may be 
minimal. 
3.1  Plan selection and community rating  
 
Under the Australian community rating rules, insurers are permitted to offer a variety of 
plans which may be designed to screen  individuals into plans that are more suitable to 
their risk classes (Industry Commission (1997)).   If individuals are able to be perfectly 
screened, then plan design enables the insurer to perfectly overcome community rating.  
By allocating individuals to different plans based on the individual’s risk category, the 
insurer is able to circumvent the need to charge all risk classes the same price.  
This is actually a well established idea in the economics literature due to Stiglitz (1977). 
Stiglitz suggested that when an insurer is unable to observe the risk characteristic of a  
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consumer, the insurer can design and price plans in such a way that high risk and low risk 
consumers self-select into different plans. While this is not as profitable as when the 
insurer observes risk and can design plans specifically for each risk type, it is none the 
less more profitable than insuring all risk types under the same plan (i.e. pooling). 
Although with community rating, the insurer does observe the risk type,  he or she is 
precluded from excluding individuals from plans on the basis of risk. This is similar to 
the case when risk types are unobserved.  
For example, joint replacement surgery is almost solely demanded by people aged over 
65 year. Therefore, insurers may restrict this benefit to the most expensive and 
comprehensive plan as a means of selecting older people into this plan.  The following 
consumer information provided by an insurer suggests that this might be the case: 
“If you're healthy, young and single then Bodyguard Young Singles cover is an excellent 
hospital and extras package. You save on your premiums because Bodyguard provides 
private hospital benefits for services that young singles normally require. By reducing the 
level of cover on those services you are unlikely to need in a private hospital we can keep 
your premiums lower.”
7 
If this particular insurer is successful in screening the younger consumers into this low-
coverage and low-priced plan (and attracting older people into another plan), the insurer 
effectively avoids the pooling of risk classes that community rating intends to promote. 
Such screening prevents cross-subsidisation between age groups and, more importantly, 
means that as people get older they are forced to step-up through increasingly expensive 
plans. The sort of lifetime cover that is an advantage of community rating is undermined.  
However, one ought not to interpret the insurer’s behaviour as “cheating” older people. If 
insurers are unable to select the elderly into more expensive plans, then expensive 
services like hip-replacements may never be covered by insurance. This is because – as 
Stiglitz points out - forcing the pooling of risk types can cause complete market failure . 
                                                            
7
 See http://www.nib.com.au/index_about.html  
  10 
The inability of the elderly to obtain insurance would be reduce the welfare of older 
people. 
  
New Zealand provides an interesting contrast to Australia in terms of the number of plans 
offered by private insurers. Table 1 compares the number of separate insurance plans 
available through the largest private health insurers in Australia and New Zealand. In 
New Zealand, where community rating is not imposed, plan diversity is less than in 
Australia although coverage rates are similar. Medibank offer almost double the number 
of plans offered by Southern Cross in New Zealand. The diversity of plans offered by 
Medibank provides casual empirical evidence that screening may occur. 
 
  Australia NZ 
Plan pricing   Community Rated  Not 
Community 
Rated 
Number of plan options offered by 
largest private insurer  
21 11 
Private insurance as a proportion 
of total national health care funding
11% 6% 
Percentage of population covered 
by private insurance 
32% 37% 
Table 1: New Zealand and Australian Insurance statistics 
Notes and Sources: The insurers considered are Medibank Private in Australia and 
Southern Cross in New Zealand. A “plan” is defined as a product for which a 
premium is quoted. For example, different excess levels for the same hospital plan 
are defined as different plans.  Medibank plans are those available in the NSW and 
were obtained from the Medibank Private web page; Southern Cross plans are 
derived from the Consumer’s Institute health insurance tables available from 
http://www.consumer.org.nz/consumer/apr99-healthins.html. Source of private 
insurance expenditure and insurance coverage is Australia’s Health 2000 (Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2000) and Health Expenditure Trends in 
New Zealand 1980-99 (Wellington: Ministry of Health).  
  
  11 
If community rating forces insurers to use plan design to screen risk types, there will be 
sub-optimal insurance design
8 in the sense that plans are being designed to achieve two 
objectives: (1) provide coverage for all risky health services and (2) create incentives for 
choosing the appropriate plan
9. For instance, the premium difference between a plan 
which offers joint replacement and one which does not, will be more than the expected 
cost of joint replacement. It will also reflect that fact that the need for joint replacement 
and underlying risk are correlated. In this case, young and low-risk individuals who 
might value a more comprehensive coverage will be poorly served. This is the standard 
Stiglitz result that screening contracts typically offer low-risk consumers less than full 
insurance.  
If community rating is causing distortions in plan design, it is not clear that premium 
subsidies will lessen this distortion. This is because premium subsidies are not correlated 
with patient risk-class. Therefore, premium subsidies do not reduce the incentives on the 
insurers to screen risk types.  
3.2  Evidence of adverse selection in the private health insurance market 
 
If the predictions of  adverse selection are correct, we expect to see much higher 
insurance coverage amongst older people. This is because age is strongly correlated to the 
predicted demand  for private care. Under community rating, younger people are 
subsidising older people and therefore ought to opt-out of insurance. Using PHIAC data, 
we graph insurance coverage and benefits per head of population in Figure 3. We expect 
there to be a strong correlation between these two.   
Benefits per member and the percentage of the population in the age-group who have 
hospital insurance are plotted on the graph. While the benefits per head of population 
illustrates a strong exponential trend over the age range, membership coverage does not 
demonstrate the same trend.  
                                                            
8 Indeed, it is well recognised that when Managed Care organisations are paid by capitation, they have an incentive to 
distort the sort of services offered in order to attract the low-risk types.  See for example Frank, Glazer and McGuire 
(1998) 
9 This latter aspect is a familiar concept from the adverse selection literature (Stiglitz, J. (1977))   
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Figure 3: Percentage insured in 1998 by benefits per age group  
Under community rating, all age groups ought to be paying the same premium, while the 
average benefit per person in this sample being $114 per quarter. As is illustrated in 
Figure 3, this is considerably more than the average benefit for all those aged less than 55 
years and considerably less for those aged over 55 years. Yet coverage rates for those 
over 55 years appear to be less than coverage rates amongst the younger population 
which is strongly contradictory evidence of adverse selection.  
4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the arguments used to justify the PHIIA. We 
argue that if the aim of this policy is to reduce demand on public hospitals, then it ought 
to target the older population who have the highest health expenditure. Expanding 
insurance rates amongst the young, healthy population who make few demands on the 
health system will have little effect on the costs of Medicare. Preliminary data indicates 
that most of the expansion in insurance coverage is coming from young, low cost people. 
This implies that the expected savings in hospital services from this expansion is likely to 
be less than the cost of the subsidy.  
We conclude that the insurance subsidy may be simply shifting resources to the private 
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